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The standard chicken game is a popular model of certain important real scenarios
but does not allow for the escalation behaviour these are typically associated with.
This is problematic if the critical, ﬁnal decisions in these scenarios are sensitive to
previous escalation. We introduce and analyse, theoretically and by experiment, a
new game which permits escalation behaviour. Compared with an equivalent chicken
game, Pareto-suboptimal outcomes are signiﬁcantly more frequent. This result is
inconsistent with our rational choice analysis and possible psychological roots are
explored.
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Suppose you observe two players gambling over a pot of eight chips in a casino.
They can either fold or raise using the one chip each of them holds. If both
players raise, the pot goes to the house. If one raises and the other does not,
the former gains the pot while the latter keeps one chip. If neither raises,
the pot is split equally. Players decide simultaneously, i.e. under imperfect
information. What would you predict to be the outcome? What would you
advise players to do?
Now suppose you are told the situation is actually the nal stage in a game
which began with each player holding four chips with two in the pot. In each
stage, players decide simultaneously whether to raise by placing one chip in
the pot or to fold. The game ends as soon as a player folds (the pot goes to the
raising player or is shared equally if both fold) or otherwise when the players
have no chips left to bet (the house wins the pot). Would knowledge of the
existence of three preceding stages change your analysis, and if so, how?
The interactions in both scenarios belong to a important type 1 where partici-
pants make claims in dividing a joint benet which is lost if they cannot agree.
What makes such situations interesting is that in pursuing their individually
maximal payos, participants jockey for position and risk the individually and
collectively most harmful outcome. Consequently, there is an important role
for prediction and advice in situations of this kind (e.g. Hargreaves-Heap and
Varoufakis 2002). Towards this end, the standard (i.e. one-shot 22) chicken
game has been used in both theoretical and experimental analysis. However,
in their real settings, these situations vary in complexity and most are likely to
be more complex than our rst scenario, which mirrors the standard chicken
game. As a result, it has been argued that while its simple structure elegantly
captures the essence of these situations and renders them amenable to rigor-
ous examination, it by the same token fails to adequately allow for some of
their material aspects (Kahn 1965, pp 10-15, Snyder 1971, p. 87, Brams 1993,
p. 106, O'Neil 1994, p. 997, Field 2008, p. 6).
One such aspect in which we are interested here consists of brinkmanship
and escalation, important characteristics of many of the real phenomena the
chicken game is used to model. Brinkmanship entails players incrementally
and irreversibly raising the risk they take in order to get others to accede, in
turn generating increasing escalation of the situation (Kahn, 1965; Schelling,
1966; Pruitt and Kim, 2003). In this sense, the chicken game captures only
the nal stage of an escalating interaction that unfolds progressively over suc-
1 Applications include market entry under natural monopoly conditions (Ghe-
mawat, 1997, chapter 7), industrial or international trade disputes (Carpenter and
Rudisill, 2003), superpower conicts (O'Neil, 1994; Zagare, 1996) as well as animal
contests over food sources (Maynard Smith, 1982).
2cessive stages. In such interactions, players initially do not choose between
backing down or risking immediate disaster as in the standard chicken game.
Rather, they initially choose between backing down and further escalating,
with the possibility of the disaster only arising nally after some periods of
mutual brinkmanship behaviour. The second scenario described above incor-
porates the possibility of such previous escalation into the rst: because the
collectively harmful outcome results from players' decisions in the nal stage
of such scenarios, and to the extent that it arose through prior gradual esca-
lation among players, modelling needs to account for the escalation process.
In short, if prediction and advice dier between the two scenarios described
above, the standard chicken game is not an appropriate model to shed light
on real scenarios and an alternative `escalation game' is needed.
We approach this question by comparing players' critical choices, i.e. the nal
ones capable of bringing about disaster, in both scenarios described above.
To the extent that the two available actions in the nal stage are associated
with the same consequences irrespective of previous escalation, no dierence
in behaviour should be observed, supporting the use of the standard chicken
game. However, there are good reasons to suspect previous escalation may
lead to greater likelihood of disaster. First, one might suspect that the nal
stage of escalation and the one-shot chicken game do represent substantively
dierent situations even if actions and payos are the same: as early stages
provide opportunities for backing down, it may be the case that players in
later stages of escalation situations are typically less risk averse than those
in the one-shot game. However, it is not clear what eect this would have on
player behaviour. While all players' lesser risk averseness suggests more risky
play, common knowledge of it might conversely suggest greater caution and
cancel out any eect of a changing risk prole among typical players. Second,
irrespective of the level of their risk averseness, players may be subject to
habituation to the increasing level of risk or other potential psychological
eects of escalation such as sunk cost fallacies, overcondence or spite.
It is this latter possibility that forms our central interest in this paper. Our
intuition is that previous escalation can indeed inuence decisions towards the
greater possibility of disaster through psychological processes. In particular,
we hypothesise this eect between the critical stage of escalation situations
compared with the one-shot game with otherwise identical game parameters,
even if relevant player characteristics such as risk attitudes are controlled for.
Such a nding would have practical signicance as well as implications for the
use of the one-shot chicken game in generating better understanding of these
important situations. We examine this issue theoretically and by experiment.
In the following, we introduce a new game designed to capture the possibility
of escalation through minimal modications to the standard chicken game.
We present theoretical analysis before reporting our experiment designed to
compare critical behaviour in it with the standard chicken game. The rest of
3the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 contains the theoretical analysis.
We rst appraise the chicken game as a model of escalation before presenting
and analysing the escalation game we propose as an alternative. The exper-
iment we conducted is reported in section 3. Section 4 concludes this paper
with a discussion of our results and their implications.
2 Theoretical analysis
We begin by assessing the eect of previous escalation on critical decisions
theoretically. For this purpose, we examine the standard chicken game and
its drawbacks as a model before outlining the escalation game we propose as
an alternative. We then ascertain any theoretical dierences between critical
decisions in both games allowing for diering risk attitudes in players. These
ndings can then be used as a benchmark for our experimental exploration
of the hypothesised psychological eects that our theoretical model based on
rational decisions cannot capture.
2.1 The standard chicken game
In the standard form commonly used in game theory, the chicken game is a
symmetric 2  2 game with the action set fA,Bg and symbolic payos shown
in gure 1, which obey the condition T > R > S > P. Without loss of gen-
erality 2 , we additionally consider versions with a xed benet of 100 to be
divided, i.e. where 2R = T + S, with R = 50 and P = 0. Each player's best
action is the opposite of the co-player's. In particular, the game has multi-
ple Nash Equilibria in the two inequitable divisions [A,B] and [B,A] as well
as in mixed strategies where each player adopts action A with probability
p(A)= (P   S)=(R   S   T + P), which, under our conditions, is S=50. All
outcomes are Pareto-ecient bar [B,B]. In the mixed strategy equilibrium,
players' expected values of playing either action or any probability mix be-
tween them are equal, and, in our case, yield the expected value of playing the
game as T(p) given by TS=50 = 2S S2=50. Since 0 < S < 50, this increases
in S and decreases in T. To wit, the smaller is the disparity between players
in unequal divisions, the greater the value of the game to them as action A
associated with equitable division becomes relatively more attractive. Players
in such games have more reason to choose action A the smaller T=S, the less
likely the co-player is deemed to choose A and the more risk averse he or she
is. The latter is due to the greater variance in the payos associated with B
compared with A (e.g. de Heus et al. 2010). The specic payos for the game
we used in the experiment are also shown in gure 1 and yield the mixed Nash
Equilibrium where players adopt action A with probability p(A)=0.4, giving
2 Rapoport and Chammah (1966) dene the chicken game as having payos that
additionally satisfy 2R > T + S to avoid the possibility of cooperative play by
alternating between the asymmetric outcomes in repeated one-shot games, which
we do not consider here.
4Fig. 1. The standard chicken game in extensive form. Players I and II decide between
an acquiescing (A) and a bold (B) action for the symbolic payos shown. The actual
payos used in the experiment are also given.
an equilibrium expected value of the game of 32.
The chicken game, as game theory generally, provides a powerful way to ex-
plore strategic behaviour using a simplied model designed to capture the
essence of real situations while making these amenable to rigorous examina-
tion. However, the cost of simplicity arises to the extent that crucial aspects of
real phenomena are not accounted for. In their use to explore real phenomena,
models are useful partly to the extent that they capture those factors thought
to be responsible for the observed eects. This kind of case has been made
repeatedly against the standard chicken game as a model for the study of esca-
lation behaviour. It can be illustrated by comparing chicken to the well-known
dare involving two cars on a collision course on a highway it is based on and
to which it owes its name, which can be thought of
as a stage game with discrete time intervals as the vehicles approach each
other. During each interval players can swerve, threaten to discard the steer-
ing wheel, actually throw it out, or irrevocably commit to a device which
[...] will lock the wheel (Field (2008), p. 5, italics added).
Highway chicken is often thought to capture the essence of escalation be-
haviour in real contexts such as superpower relations \because of the scope
it oers for exploring the attraction and perils of competitive risk taking, of
brinksmanship, of committing to a course of action that leaves some part
of the outcome to chance" (Field (2008), p. 6). However, the abstraction of
the situation into the one-shot chicken game does not allow for this kind of
strategising associated with real scenarios. Poundstone (1993) argues that the
standard chicken represents
the last possible moment of a game of highway chicken. Each driver has
calculated his reaction time and his car's turning radius [and] there comes a
moment of truth in which each must decide whether or not to swerve. This
decision is irrevocable and must be made in ignorance of the other driver's
decision. There is no time for one driver's last-minute decision to inuence
5Fig. 2. An escalation game with four stages. Players are denoted by Roman numerals.
the other driver's decision (Poundstone (1993), p. 197, italics added).
A similar argument is made by Dixit and Skeath (1999, p. 457). The standard
chicken game therefore does not allow for brinkmanship behaviour, i.e. (a) a
series of mutual decisions whether to (b) incrementally and irreversibly raise
the level of risk in order to get the other player to accede (Kahn 1965, p.3;
Staw 1981, p. 578; Pruitt and Kim 2003, p. 89). This is problematic to the
extent that the possibility of previous escalation moderates player behaviour
in the critical stage of the game in which researchers are interested.
2.2 The escalation game
In order to assess the eect of previous escalation on critical behaviour, we
now introduce the escalation game which makes those minimal adjustments to
the standard chicken game necessary to allow for brinkmanship behaviour. It
is designed to permit us to compare behaviour in the critical stage of chicken-
type situations with and without previous escalation. The escalation game
preserves a number of the desirable features of the standard chicken game,
such as its basic structure of players, payos and imperfect information in
every stage. However, it is based more closely on highway chicken and involves
the two following modications: rst, the disastrous outcome becomes possible
only after the basic choice between the two actions is repeated some number
of stages. Secondly, each subsequent stage is accompanied by increasing levels
of risk in the payo function inherent in the variance of potential payos. The
intuition behind our design is the following: players' irreversible commitment
of resources in escalation processes incrementally generates the increasingly
risky and polarised payos between the player who backs down and the one
who does not.
For the purposes of this paper, we consider a four-stage escalation game as
depicted in gure 2. In every stage, players face simultaneous decisions between
A and B, and mutual decisions of A end the game in an even split. If in any
stage one player chooses A while the other chooses B, the game ends in an
increasingly favourable division for the latter player. If no player chooses A at
any point, the game ends in the nal stage with zero payos for both players.
6Fig. 3. An escalation game in strategic form. The payos are those used in our
experiment. Pure Nash Equilibria indicated by boldface payos.
In general, the escalation game involves simultaneous decisions over stages
i where the payos obey Ti > R > Si > P. Additionally, Ti < Ti+1 and
Si > Si+1. Also, as before, in our analysis we assume 2R = Ti + Si as well
as R = 50 and P = 0. The game has ve possible pure strategies (see gure
3). The rst four strategies (A1 to A4) respectively correspond to the number
of the stage in which a player chooses A. The fth, ALL-B, involves never
choosing A. In the resulting two pure Nash Equilibria, one player plays A in
stage one, while the other plays B throughout.
Within these conditions, we consider, for the purposes of further analysis and
experiment, the escalation game with the specic numerical payos in gure
2. To provide the opportunity to examine the impact of diering risk attitudes
and previous escalation on critical decisions, its fourth and nal stage is, in
terms of actions and payos, identical to the one-shot game in gure 1 with the
same mixed Nash equilibrium p(A)i=4=0.4. When we substitute the resulting
equilibrium expected value of 32 for that stage as the payo for the subgame
following mutual B-decisions in stage three of the escalation game, calculate
the resulting mixed Nash Equilibrium for that stage and repeat this process
until the rst stage, we obtain the proportions of players adopting each of the
ve pure strategies as the overall mixed Nash Equilibrium for our escalation
game with risk-neutral players (see the top panel in table 1 where r=0).
2.3 Risk preferences in the chicken and escalation games
As discussed, players' appetite for risk may inuence decisions in both the
chicken and the escalation game. We now examine the eects of dierent
parametric assumptions about risk attitudes in a population of players on
equilibrium behaviour. In particular, we assess the notion that a typical player
in the last stage of the escalation game may be less risk averse, i.e. values high
payos relatively more than in the chicken scenario. While in both games ac-
tion A is associated with a lower variance in available payos than B, this is
increasingly the case over the successive stages of the escalation game. As a
result, decisions may be sensitive to risk attitudes in the population (Engel-
mann and Steiner, 2007; de Heus et al., 2010). We therefore expect more risk
averse players to exit earlier, typically leaving more risk seeking ones in its
7critical stage compared with the chicken game, where no player can exit the
game before this point.
To work out equilibria for players with varying degrees of risk averseness for
both games, we assume agents have utility functions U as the payo x received
from a particular game adjusted for individual risk preferences as r obeying
constant relative risk aversion. They are given by the functional form 3 U(x) =
x1 r. We use this formula to transform the payos of both games for dierent
values of r and repeated the analyses above. 4 The mixed strategy equilibria
we obtained for both games assuming players' (homogeneous) risk preferences
of dierent levels r are shown in the top panel of table 1.
In real populations, risk attitudes are unlikely to be homogeneous. As a result,
we also determined mixed Nash Equilibria for heterogeneous risk preferences of
dierent levels. In particular, we performed a computer simulation of changes
in the representation of the games' dierent possible pure strategies among a
population of learning and interacting agents. 5 The proportions of the pure
strategies within the population adjust according to their success and, when
convergence is reached, can be interpreted as the equilibrium mixed strategy
(Aumann, 1987, p. 41).
We consider populations with normally-distributed heterogeneous values for
r using the utility transformation above. While the transformation of payos
into utilities using dierent values for r is intuitively realistic, it means we
cannot use utilities to compare the success of agents with unequal r-values
in order to implement learning. As a result, for simulations with heteroge-
neous risk preferences between agents, we segment the population into nine
sub-populations each with dierent respective values of r shared by all their
members. The sizes of sub-populations were chosen to generate a discretised
normal distribution of risk in the overall population with a standard deviation
of 0.1 and remain constant throughout a simulation. In each sub-population,
the ve possible pure strategies are equally represented initially. Agents are
matched for game play across the whole population, but their strategies' suc-
3 Our approach follows Holt and Laury (2002, p. 1646). In order to preserve positive
marginal utility of wealth, for r > 1, we use their formula U(x) = x1 r=(1 r). For
r = 1, U(x) = ln(x) is used.
4 For the specic payos and risk preferences (i.e.  1  r  1) we use, these
transformations never violate the conditions of either game.
5 The application of standard analytical techniques would require solving an ex-
ponentially increasing number of simultaneous equations which cannot feasibly be
done through matrix inversion. The computer simulation technique provides an al-
ternative approach when mathematical analysis is impractical or impossible due to
model or dynamic complexity. It also permits the observation of the model's be-
haviour under alternative initial parametric assumptions (Simon, 1981, e.g.). The
Python programming code we used is available on request.
8cess is evaluated within their respective sub-populations of agents who share
the same risk attitudes.
A typical simulation proceeded as follows. First, a population is generated
either homogeneously (i.e. with a single sub-population) or consisting of nine
sub-populations with their respective sizes and values of r chosen. The pro-
gram then determines the total utility received by each pure strategy in each
sub-population as the payos it would receive in a round-robin tournament
among the entire population, transformed for each game according to the util-
ity function above. This calculation is based on the game's payos in gure
3 as well as the representation of all pure strategies in the population and
agents' risk attitudes. Strategies are then propagated using a standard repli-
cator dynamic (e.g. Hofbauer and Sigmund 2003). After each generation of the
simulation, the proportion of each pure strategy within each sub-population
in the next generation is determined by its relative success compared with
other strategies in that sub-population. This is repeated until the proportions
in every sub-population have stabilised. This basic process was repeated for
dierent mean values of r for heterogeneous normally-distributed populations.
The lower panel in table 1 reports simulation results as the nal representa-
tions of the ve pure strategies in the population as a whole upon convergence,
which we interpret as the mixed strategy equilibrium. 6 Critical chicken and
escalation game decisions in mixed strategy equilibrium are reported as re-
spective values for B, the proportion of players choosing B in the critical
stage in equilibrium for each of the games. This rises for both games with
falling r irrespective of its distribution, i.e. with populations that are more
risk seeking on average. Following intuition, more risk seeking agents value
higher game payos more and therefore are more likely to opt for B in the
critical stage of both games. While we might expect the falling average risk
averseness of co-players from stage to stage might instil caution, as commented
earlier, all players' greater valuation of larger payos more than countervails
such an eect.
The last column in the table shows B, the dierence in critical decisions
between the two games for dierent values and distributions of risk preferences
we are interested in. There are no dierences between critical chicken and
escalation game behaviour for populations with homogenous risk preferences
of any level. Conversely, modest dierences do arise with normally-distributed
heterogeneous risk preferences. They are greatest for the interval r  0:5 
r  0. For populations with the average risk attitudes ( 0:15  r  1)
6 We checked the program by comparing the mixed Nash equilibria it generates
for the homogeneous populations with dierent values for r with the analytically-
derived results which matched perfectly. In addition, in a series of robustness tests,
our results were not found to be sensitive to initial conditions such as population
size and composition.
9r Chicken Escalation game B
Ave. A B A1 A2 A3 A4 All-B B
Homogeneous risk preferences
-1.00 0.093 0.907 0.327 0.020 0.175 0.044 0.434 0.907 0.000
-0.50 0.198 0.802 0.343 0.030 0.173 0.090 0.364 0.802 0.000
0.00 0.400 0.600 0.250 0.150 0.100 0.200 0.300 0.600 0.000
0.50 0.705 0.295 0.410 0.018 0.000 0.403 0.169 0.295 0.000
1.00 0.973 0.027 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.973 0.027 0.027 0.000
Normally-distributed risk preferences
-1.00 0.126 0.874 0.329 0.024 0.173 0.044 0.430 0.907 0.033
-0.50 0.229 0.771 0.366 0.012 0.186 0.075 0.361 0.828 0.057
0.00 0.400 0.600 0.313 0.092 0.137 0.160 0.298 0.651 0.051
0.50 0.639 0.361 0.265 0.162 0.000 0.366 0.207 0.361 0.000
1.00 0.891 0.109 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.891 0.109 0.109 0.000
Table 1
Theoretical results of mixed strategy equilibria as the proportion of agents adopting
the available pure strategies in the chicken (obtained by analysis) and the escalation
game (by simulation) under dierent averages and distributions of risk attitudes
in the population. B represents critical B-decisions. The nal column shows the
dierence in this between the two games.
representing about 90% of subjects in the experiments by Holt and Laury
(2002), we would expect an increase in B-decisions between the critical stages
of the two games in the region of 5% caused by risk preferences alone. It arises
as dierences in risk attitudes among players cause more risk averse ones to
exit the game earlier. The psychological factors we hypothesise may add to
this modest eect and will be examined next.
3 Experiment
While our theoretical analysis demonstrates the role of diering risk prefer-
ences in contributing to critical B-decisions, it is not suited for the examination
of what we loosely term `psychological' inuences to which we now turn using
an experimental approach. We begin by considering what motivations, other
than their own risk preferences, nal-stage escalation game players may have
that do not apply to chicken, despite the same available actions and payos
in both. We use this discussion to formulate hypotheses for experimental ex-
amination. We then report our experiment and its results which we compare
with the benchmark established theoretically.
103.1 Hypotheses
In both of our games, we can think of players choosing between actions based
on their respective expected utility, i.e. are motivated by the available payos
as well as their beliefs concerning the likely behaviour of the co-player. Both
motivations may be sensitive to a number of well-known psychological eects
triggered by previous escalation that make risky behaviour more likely. We
consider three plausible such factors.
To begin with, escalation game players may continue to choose B in the last
stage as an `escalating commitment to a course of action'. There are several
possible reasons for this type of eect established in a management litera-
ture relating to investment decisions (Staw, 1976). First, they include self-
justication and norms for consistency (Staw, 1981). On this account, a nal
B-decision has an added attraction in retrospectively lending apparent ratio-
nality to all previous ones. Another way to look at the same issue is in terms
of overcondence or misperception (e.g. Camerer and Weber 1999, p. 78; Baz-
erman 2005, p. 88). Players might systematically underestimate the likelihood
of co-players choosing B also to resolve cognitive dissonance between a desire
to be consistent in continuing with action B and a realistic assessment of the
likelihood of the co-player choosing similarly. This type of considerations is
also related to the sunk cost fallacy Camerer and Weber 1999, p. 75). Escala-
tion game players may interpret the increasing, irreversible level of risk they
accept in subsequent stages of the game as an irrecoverable investment which
they may wish to continue pursuing. Second, an ongoing escalation situation
may be accompanied by changes in the protagonists' motivations from initially
pure self-regard to fairness concerns and nally spite (Glasl, 1982; Fisher and
Keashly, 1989; Camerer and Weber, 1999). Increasing ill will towards each
other develops as neither compromises. Action B provides more scope for
avoiding a `loss' against or harming the co-player. The third factor, which
forms our central interest in this paper, has to our knowledge not been exam-
ined in relation to escalation bargaining situations: players may be subject to
a phenomenon metaphorically called the boiling frog. 7 Here, decision makers
continuously adjust rather than react to small, incremental changes in their
environment that together amount to conditions that would have provoked a
reaction had they materialised in one step. While the phenomenon was orig-
inally studied in reexes, it has been demonstrated experimentally to aect
risk perception of animals (Rodriguez-Prieto et al., 2009) and human cogni-
tive valuations (Fetherstonehaugh et al., 1997). It has been put forward as an
7 In the (apparently inaccurate) metaphor, a frog fails to ee when the temperature
of the water is raised suciently slowly. We use this term to describe a family
of phenomena known under dierent terms which has habituation, an organism's
decreasing response to a repeated stimulus, as a possible root. The salami tactic
can be deployed to exploit this tendency in others.
11explanation for the lack of public response to environmental or political risks
through `creeping normalcy' (Diamond, 1995; Krugman, 2009, e.g.). Applied
to the escalation game, players who repeatedly choose B over its course may
become gradually accustomed to the greater level of risk involved in successive
stages. A de-sensitivisation to greater risk may most naturally be interpreted
as a decreasing value for the parameter r in players as the game unfolds and a
concomitant greater tendency to play B. Taken together, our theoretical anal-
ysis including the inuence of risk and discussion of the possible psychological
factors generate the following nested hypotheses for experimental testing:
Hypothesis 1: There will be relatively more B-decisions in the critical stage of
the escalation game compared with chicken.
Hypothesis 1a: Heterogeneous risk attitudes cause relatively more B-decisions
in the critical stage of the escalation game compared with chicken.
Hypothesis 1b: Psychological factors cause relatively more B-decisions in the
critical stage of the escalation game compared with chicken.
As both sub-hypotheses contribute positively towards an overall eect of hy-
pothesis 1, we need a way to separate their respective inuences. The psycho-
logical factors of hypothesis 1b operate dierently to players' risk attitudes in
hypothesis 1a we examined theoretically. They are likely to be the result of
particular cognitions that accompany successive stages of play in the escala-
tion game as it unfolds. Risk considerations, in contrast, can more plausibly
inuence decisions even a priori, i.e. be undertaken before it starts. If so, we
may use dierent methods of experimental decision elicitation to isolate the
impact of risk attitudes and psychological factors respectively. In particular,
we perform an experiment with both games using the `hot' direct response
method as well as the `cold' strategy method. In the former, decisions are
made and recorded in real time as subjects interact. In the latter, subjects are
asked to supply full descriptions of their strategies, i.e. decisions for any pos-
sible game history, which are subsequently used in determining their choices
when matched with other subjects (Selten, 1967). Theoretically, both methods
should yield the same results for rational players. However, the point has been
made that dierences may arise to the extent that, in hot situations, subjects
may think about decisions dierently (Roth 1995, p. 323) and respond more
emotionally (Brandts and Charness 2000, p. 228). In particular, some psycho-
logical processes like self-justication are retrospective (Staw, 1981, p. 583),
making the strategy method unsuitable for their measurement. As a result,
we use the hot condition to elicit the psychological eects we hypothesise.
123.2 Tasks
Our experiment was designed to test whether subjects' critical decisions in
the standard chicken game 8 and escalation game dier and to what extent
any dierence can be explained with reference to risk attitudes or psycholog-
ical factors. The game task was conducted using a 2  2 experimental design
(see table 2). The rst dimension concerns the possibility of escalation. In
the chicken condition, subjects faced the standard chicken game with payos
as shown in gure 1. Under escalation, subjects played the escalation game
depicted in gure 2. For the experimental task, our payo choices within the
conditions of the two games were guided by considerations of generating suf-
cient observations. We chose payos for the experimental escalation game so
that enough subjects proceeded to the nal stage to allow reliable observation
of critical behaviour. In addition, we ensured that every individual stage i
constituted a chicken game in its own right in that the equilibrium expected
value of the subgame following mutual B-decisions remained strictly less than
Si. The second dimension of the game task involves the elicitation method of
subject decisions for both games. In the cold version, decisions were recorded
using the strategy method. Cold escalation subjects were asked to specify de-
cisions for every stage of the task before being matched but told that if an
A-decision was recorded, all decisions made for later stages would be void.
For cold chicken, decisions were recorded for the one stage only. The hot con-
dition describes the use of the direct response method. Subjects knew they
were matched with another subject prior to making decisions, and that all
decisions would be recorded simultaneously during a set period of one minute
per decision shown on the screen. For hot chicken, subjects made one decision,
whereas in the hot escalation game, decisions were made for up to four stages
or until an A-decision was recorded. In addition to the game task, we measured
subjects' risk attitudes as possible moderators of behaviour. In particular, we
administered the risk preference elicitation task introduced by Holt and Laury
(2002) following their binary choice lottery procedure with the exception that
payos were multiplied by a factor of twenty. In the task, subjects face ten
binary choices between safe and increasingly risky gambles. The task was de-
signed as a measurement of individuals' risk preferences as the number of safe
gambles chosen out of the ten, from which corresponding values for r can be
imputed.
8 To date, the chicken game has received relatively modest attention by experi-
mentalists (Camerer and Thaler 2003, p. 164; de Heus et al. 2010, p. 737). Vari-
ables shown to aect behaviour include variations in the payos (Rapoport and
Chammah, 1966; Ells and Sermat, 1968), communication (Swingle and Santi, 1972),
beliefs about other players based on their characteristics such as labels (Hargreaves-
Heap and Varoufakis, 2002), status and gender (Grant and Sermat, 1969; Conrath,
1972), as well as subjects' own characteristics including mood (Hertel et al., 2000)
and values (Liebrand et al., 1986).
133.3 Procedure
The experiment took place at a private, English-spoken university in the Peo-
ple's Republic of China in May 2010. A total of 286 volunteers were recruited
via e-mail invitation from the undergraduate student population and partic-
ipated in ten sessions conducted in a campus computer laboratory. Subjects
were mostly Chinese nationals with a mean age of 20 of whom about three
quarters were female. Each session was devoted to one of the four task condi-
tions and subjects were allocated in such a way as to generate sucient sample
size for each (see table 2). In particular, to aord a statistically meaningful
comparison between decisions in the last stage of the chicken and escalation
games, more subjects were allocated towards sessions with the latter to com-
pensate for early-stage exits due to A-decisions. Sessions began with an an-
nouncement in Chinese explaining experimental discipline, subject anonymity
and privacy as well as monetary incentives and their delivery. The experimen-
tal tasks were conducted subsequently using a computerised interface with
complete English instructions programmed using z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007).
Subjects additionally received paper copies of the instructions in both Chinese
and English. 9 The program included a comprehension quiz for each task. Sub-
jects with incorrect answers were individually instructed until correct answers
were elicited before proceeding. Subjects were randomly matched for game
play at the session level and co-players remained anonymous to each other
throughout. The risk elicitation task followed the game task in every session.
After their completion, subjects lled in a pen-and-paper questionnaire in
Chinese containing demographic questions. At the end of each session, which
typically lasted about one hour, subjects received a show-up fee of 10 Chinese
Renminbi (RMB) as well as the pay-out for one of the tasks chosen at random
in cash, on average about 38 RMB. 10
3.4 Results
The experiment generated a dataset with observations for subjects' demo-
graphics as well as decisions for the game and binary choice lottery tasks. 11
We now report the eect of the experimental variables on critical decisions in
the two games.
The experimental results for the game tasks are summarised in table 2. In
the chicken game, about a third of subjects opted for B. There was no eect
of using the hot or cold elicitation method on chicken behaviour, conrming
9 Copies of our instructions and the program are available upon request.
10 At the time of the experiment, 1 RMB traded at 0.146 U.S. $. In the area of
China where the experiment was performed, students typically earn around RMB
8 an hour for casual work.
11 In one session, a computer crash caused loss of some data for the binary choice
lottery task for 18 subjects.
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Stage Hot n Cold n
1 0.680 (83) 122 0.750 (75) 100
2 0.793 (46) 58 0.813 (61) 75
3 0.868 (33) 38 0.689 (42) 61
4 0.786 (22) 28 0.548 (23) 42
Chicken game
1 0.367 (11) 30 0.382 (13) 34
Table 2
Proportion (and number) of B-decisions across experimental conditions and game
stages. Note that in the hot condition of the escalation game, some subjects who
choose B fail to proceed to the next stage due to their co-player's decision for A
which ends the game.
the same result in Brandts and Charness (2000). Compared with chicken, we
observe a much larger proportion of B-decisions in the critical stage of the es-
calation game. In cold escalation, more than half of subjects in the last stage
chose B, and more than three quarters did so in hot escalation. The dierence
between critical escalation and chicken game behaviour is marginally insignif-
icant for the cold (one-tail Fisher exact p = 0:114), and signicant (p < 0:001)
for the hot condition. Both tests yield signicant dierences if we pool all
chicken game observations due to non-dierence within them by elicitation
method (p = 0:061 for cold and 0.000 for hot escalation). We interpret these
main ndings as support for hypothesis 1, that previous escalation overall
generates more critical B-decisions. In addition, the marginal (in)signicance
obtained for cold escalation is suggestive of the relatively greater role of psy-
chological factors compared with risk preferences in contributing to this over-
all eect. This is further supported by a signicant dierence (p = 0:036)
in critical B-decisions between cold and hot escalation. While risk attitudes
caused a small increase in B-decisions after escalation, an additional jump can
be detected using the hot method designed to elicit psychological factors as
discussed.
We now examine to what extent risk preferences contributed towards the ef-
fects we observe, and, in particular, whether risk played the role in subject
behaviour suggested by the theoretical analysis. The distribution of risk pref-
erences in our entire subject group based on the lottery task compared with
subjects in Holt and Laury (2002) is presented in gure 4. They are measured
as each subject's number of choices (between 1 and 10) of safe alternatives
in the task. There were no dierences in these choices between our four ex-
perimental conditions (Kruskal-Wallis p=0.91). Our subjects' choices roughly
follow a normal distribution and seem somewhat more risk seeking on average
15Fig. 4. The distribution of risk attitudes as the number of safe choices (and associ-
ated r values) in our subject group as well as in Holt and Laury's (2002) low real
payo condition.
than Holt and Laury's, with a noticeable tail of high-risk preference subjects.
The average number of safe choices was 3.88, with a corresponding r of be-
tween 0.15 and -0.49. Theoretically, given this value, we would have expected
more B-behaviour in the chicken game (see table 1) than we observed, pos-
sibly suggesting the limitations of the Holt and Laury (2002) technique to
capture strategic, rather than parametric risk (see section 4). There was no
dierence in the number of safe choices between subjects who chose A and B
respectively in the hot, cold and pooled chicken game data (Mann-Whitney
p > 0:45 for all three tests). This latter result runs counter to de Heus et al.'s
(2010) nding that in the chicken game, lesser risk aversion as measured by a
12-item questionnaire was associated with more B-decisions.
Given these risk preferences we expect, from the theoretical results, to ob-
serve slightly more critical B-decisions in the escalation than in the chicken
game by virtue of risk preferences (hypothesis 1a): as discussed, subjects with
greater risk aversion exit earlier. To nd evidence for this in our experimental
data, we tested for changes in risk attitudes among subjects over the stages
of the escalation game. We regressed subjects' risk preference measures on
game decisions using the ordered logistic regression technique. In the model
we estimated, the dependent variable was the number of safe options subjects
chose out of the ten binary gambles in the lottery task (following Holt and
Laury 2002, p. 1648). For the single independent variable coded 1-5, the pure
strategy specied out of the ve possibilities was used for a regression using
cold treatment data. For the hot condition, we used the number of the stage
where a subject chose A. This led to a loss in observations from stage to stage
16as subjects exited the game due to co-player's, rather than own choice of A.
We obtained insignicant coecients both for the cold (p=0.111) and the hot
(p=0.355) condition. We also performed Mann-Whitney tests comparing the
number of safe choices of subjects in the rst and last stage of the escalation
game. There was a signicant dierence for the cold condition (p=0.038) and
an insignicant one for the hot condition (p=0.357). Despite the theoretical
ndings, there seems to be mixed evidence at best for hypothesis 1a or the
role of risk attitudes in contributing to the large observed dierences in criti-
cal B-behaviour between the chicken and escalation games. One interpretation
is that this lends support to an independent, and perhaps greater role of the
psychological factors (hypothesis 1b). However, this result warrants caution to
the extent that the Holt and Laury (2002) lottery was designed as a measure
of risk in parametric and not strategic situations. We return to this issue in
the next and nal section.
4 Discussion and conclusions
Escalation has been studied both in parametric and strategic contexts, i.e.
when the source of the uncertainty is either random or reactive and deliber-
ate. Our results are a contribution to the latter agenda. There have been other
approaches to use game theory to model strategic escalation and brinkman-
ship behaviour. One is explored in Shubik's (1971) dollar auction 12 and May-
nard Smith's (1974) related war of attrition model. Both depict escalation
somewhat dierently to us in that it becomes increasingly ruinous for all
players, whereas ours may secure the highest available payo only through
continuing brinkmanship. The dierence lies in the issue of whether an in-
creasing cost is incurred by both parties as the escalation unfolds. Also, the
dollar auction does not involve the kinds of risk considerations we examine
here as an important feature of realistic scenarios. A number of other models
consider escalation with reversible commitment to a course of action and as-
sociated scope for strategic moves and cheap talk (Rubinstein, 1982; Brams
and Kilgour, 1987), which again is dierent to what we consider here.
For the type of situation we study, our main nding is that, through psy-
chological eects, previous escalation makes the Pareto-dominated outcome
of certain kinds of bargaining situations more likely irrespective of the risk
attitudes of participants. We now discuss some of the implications of our work
before commenting on its limitations and scope for further research in this
area. First, our ndings provide empirical support for the suggestion that the
chicken game is not a suitable model for the study of those bargaining situ-
ations we described at the outset as they occur in real contexts. To be sure,
12 In this game, both the highest and second highest bid for a dollar note must be
paid, leading to the possibility of an escalating bidding war as bidders try to avoid
increasing losses.
17the game's properties make it a useful tool for theory development. How-
ever, in taking issue with the standard chicken game as a model of escalation
and proposing an alternative, we interpret them not merely as models for the
`conceptual exploration' of their internal workings, but rather for `empirical
theorising', i.e. generating insight into the real phenomenon by virtue of their
ability to capture those realities we are interested in, albeit in a simplied way
that facilitates analysis (see Hausman, 1992; Sugden, 2000). Similarly, when
used by us as an experimental task, we perceive of the escalation game as
representing the structure of choices real actors face. Second, to this extent,
our ndings have potential implications for policy designed to reduce the pos-
sibility of disastrous outcomes in relevant real bargaining scenarios, such as
international or industrial disputes. We tentatively suggest that long-winded,
escalating bargaining processes may trigger psychological phenomena such as
frog boiling that make mutually harmful outcomes more likely. Third, our re-
sults contribute to the issue of what eects cold and hot elicitation methods
may have on experimental behaviour. The survey of Brandts and Charness
(2009) nds mixed evidence of a dierence for a given task, and no evidence
for particular treatment eects being sensitive to elicitation method. In con-
trast, we nd evidence that elicitation moderates task behaviour as well as
treatment eects. Hot escalation game subjects chose B more frequently than
ones in the cold condition. The dierence in critical behaviour between the
two games is signicant for hot, but not for cold elicitation. While we attribute
this to the psychological factors involved in escalation, Brandts and Charness
(2009) do not nd their meta-result moderated by whether an experimental
task oers scope for emotions. Alternatively, there is some evidence that more
complex and, in particular, stage games oer more scope for elicitation eects
(Schotter et al., 1994; Brandts and Charness, 2000).
Our ndings also require qualication and provide scope for further work. To
advance the study of strategic escalation with irreversibility, the nature both
of subjects' risk preferences and the accompanying psychological eects need
to be better established. First, the Holt and Laury (2002) lottery tasks we and
other studies on game behaviour use (e.g. Goeree et al. 2003) was designed to
measure attitudes towards parametric, rather than strategic risk. While this
distinction may be less important in games with mixed strategy equilibria, a
dedicated measurement for strategic risk attitudes may be a useful tool (e.g.
Aumann 2009) for analysing behaviours such as escalation . Second, our work
was designed to test for the existence of psychological eects generally, but not
to distinguish between dierent types. There is scope for future research on this
issue to better formulate practical implications. Finally, a related issue that
merits further exploration is the relationship between brinkmanship behaviour
and the psychological processes that accompany it. The direction of any cau-
sation between the two and the possibility of their mutual self-reinforcement
as the basis of escalation processes generally are promising areas.
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